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I. INTRODUCTION 
Coast Guard, uh, this is, uh, COMSUPAC Peari Harbor. We have a vessel 
that has had a collision approximately nine miles south of Diamond Head. 
A commercial ship with a submarine. Vessel has sunk. Uh, people are in 
the water. The rough seas may prohibit submarine from .... 
This distress call announced the collision of a United States Navy submarine with 
the "Ehime Maru," a Japanese fisheries research and training vessel on Feb. 9, 2001, that 
left nine Japanese dead. The Ehime Maru was on a fishing and research mission when 
USS Greeneville (SSN 772) rapidly surfaced and collided with its stem. The submarine 
was conducting an "emergency ballast tank blow," a procedure used to bring subs to the 
surface in the event of an emergency, although in this case it was used for training. The 
Los Angeles-class fast-attack submarine was on a one-day cruise with 16 civilian guests. 
The sub immediately alerted search and rescue authorities as soon as the crew 
realized what happened. United States Coast Guard helicopters and aircraft were on the 
scene within 40 minutes (Gunder, 2001). Two Navy ships arrived soon after to assist 
with the rescue. 
At the heart of the crisis was the decision of the sub's commanding officer. Navy 
Commander Scott D. Waddle, to demonstrate the sub's rapid surfacing capability to his 
civilian guests who were onboard for a one-day cruise. The ship rose rapidly and crashed 
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into the Japanese boat, which sank within minutes. Descending with it into the 2,000 feet 
of water below were the bodies of four Japanese fishing students, two teachers and three 
crewmen. Among the questions of how it occurred was whether 16 civilian visitors 
aboard the submarine affected the crew's performance. Waddle was immediately 
reassigned pending the results of an investigation. 
A team from the National Transportation Safety Board took the lead in the 
investigation because it involved a civilian vessel in American waters, but the Navy 
conducted its own investigation as well. Navy officials said the findings might result in 
disciplinary measures for Waddle and some of his crewmembers if they somehow 
violated mandated safety procedures meant to prevent such disasters (Jehl, 2001). 
As media and public interest intensified, speculation continued that the ship's 
officers were somehow distracted by the presence of the 16 civilian guests onboard. 
Media reports five days after the collision noted that two of the civilian guests were 
sitting at key watch stations of the sub at the time of the accident. This further roiled 
public perceptions about the incident, especially in Japan, where officials criticized not 
only the sinking but also the submarine's perceived failure to help in the rescue. 
The Navy announced that Waddle and some of his key officers would face a 
Court of Inquiry to determine if they might be criminally liable. The results of this 
investigation would dictate whether or not the officers were recommended to go to a 
court martial and possibly serve time in prison. 
By late April, Admiral Thomas B. Fargo, the U.S. Pacific Fleet commander had 
reviewed the 119-page court of inquiry report on the accident and found that the former 
skipper of the USS Greeneville was derelict in his duties and had handled the submarine 
Submarine Collision   3 
hazardously prior to the Feb. 9 collision with the Ehime Maru (Gilmore, 2001). He also 
found no criminal intent on behalf of the sub's commander. Admiral Fargo chose to 
forego a court martial, administer nonjudicial punishment, and issue a punitive letter of 
reprimand to Waddle on April 23. The letter directed Waddle's removal from command 
of the Greeneville, and ordered him to forfeit half his pay for two months (Kifner, 2001). 
While the hearing and verdict ended what had been a promising naval career. 
Waddle still received an honorable discharge with a pension. Perhaps more importantly, 
he was spared the ignominy of a humiliating and final court martial and spared time in 
prison. In making its decision to spare its commander, the Navy risked the wrath of 
Japan, where the families of those killed by the sub were outraged (CNN.com, April 25, 
2001). 
The event strained U.S./Japanese relations and triggered a media firestorm as the 
U.S. Navy's operating procedures were thrust into the media spotlight. The Navy came 
under fire for numerous aspects of the at-sea collision including questions about how an 
accident like this could have happened in the first place. Other flashpoints were the 
apparent lack of rescue efforts by the sub, the presence of civilians on the submarine, and 
the pending inquiry and trials of the submarine's commanding officer. 
This paper will analyze the crisis management performance of the U.S. Navy 
throughout the crisis. 
This study is organized into 6 chapters: Chapter 1 provides an overview of the 
accident. Chapter 2 is a review of the scholarly literature on crisis communication 
theory. Chapter 3 provides a methodology for the case study. Chapter 4 analyzes the 
Navy's crisis communications performance per scholarly theory. Chapter 5 is a 
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discussion of the U.S. Navy's crisis communication performance. Chapter 6 provides a 
summary and suggestions for future research. 
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II. LITERATURE REVIEW 
To gain a better understanding of the U.S. Navy's crisis communications actions 
after the submarine collided with the Japanese fishing boat, it is beneficial to review 
research concerning effective public relations management during times of crisis. 
Crisis Communications 
Banks (1996) defines crisis communications as "communication between the 
organization and its publics prior to, during, and after the negative occurrence. Effective 
communication can mitigate negative aspects of a crisis and can sometimes bring an 
organization a more positive reputation than before the crisis. 
Understanding that communications was a vital element in almost all successfiil 
crisis management efforts, Marra (1998) argues that organizations who communicated 
poorly during crises often made bad situations worse. The Three Mile Island nuclear 
power accident, Exxon Valdez oil spill, and the Challenger space shuttle explosion are 
three well-known examples that demonstrate how inadequate communication strategies 
can hinder an organization's ability to manage a crisis. 
In a similar vein. Fink (1986) states that all crises have the potential to escalate 
beyond an organization's ability to control them. Additionally, he offers that all crises 
also risk coming under scrutiny of the media, interfering with normal operations and 
jeopardizing the positive public image of the organization. 
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Murphy (1996) takes a different approach using the "chaos theory" as a model for 
crisis situations whose salient feature is the volatility of public perceptions. She proposes 
that as a crisis gathers volume and complexity, an organization has the ability to 
influence events at the onset but loses that power after a certain point of escalation. She 
offers the Exxon Valdez crisis as an example of an organization missing its window of 
opportunity to manage a crisis. 
As that crisis evolved, it followed a dynamic similar to a chaotic system. After 
the oil spill off the coast of Alaska, Exxon could have exerted some control over the 
crisis, but as the company began to face backlash from environmental groups and the 
U.S. Coast Guard for its poor handling of the situation, it was quickly overwhelmed and 
lost any hope of controlling the situation. The only option an organization has at that 
juncture is to allow the events to sort themselves out while attempting to fit into the 
emerging aftermath. Murphy (1996) argues that during times of crisis, many 
organizations would opt to take an aggressive stance, but due to the uncertainty and open- 
endedness involved, the chaos theory sets limits on the purposeful management of 
volatile issues. 
Benoit (1997) identifies two elements necessary for a crisis: that the accused is 
held responsible for an action and that the act is considered offensive. He also states that 
the perceptions held by a relevant audience during a crisis are more important than the 
reality of the situation. The important point is not whether the organization is responsible 
for the offensive act, but whether relevant audiences believe the organization is at fault. 
As long as the audience perceives that the organization was at fault, the image is at risk. 
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Some scholars argue that while each crisis may be unique in some fashion, prior 
planning may help mitigate the effects of a crisis. Lesly (1991) evaluates crisis 
communications and states that an effective crisis plan should: establish that an 
organization will place the welfare of the people involved first; ensure that organization 
is prepared to be as open as possible about what happened as the facts and conditions 
permit; give priority to resolving the emergency and protecting people affected; and 
emphasize that the organization will be fair to all, including critics or opponents who may 
have instigated the problem. 
Burnett (1998) proposed the idea that effective crisis management requires 
strategic action to avoid or lessen undesirable developments and to bring about a 
desirable resolution of the crisis event. Moreover, crisis management must be a 
continuous effort. He states that crisis resolutions have both short-term and long-term 
ramifications and organizations must be cognizant of both if they are going to provide a 
permanent and congenial solution to a crisis. He argues that companies such as Union 
Carbide, Dayco, and Continental Illinois Bank appear to have dealt with their crises with 
little forethought about the future. In contrast, the rash of hostile takeovers during the 
1980s appears to have produced the opposite result. More specifically, Safeway Stores, 
Continental Airlines, and others were so preoccupied with potential takeovers that they 
often created immediate crises (e.g. store shutdowns, layoffs) which were just as 
detrimental. 
Benoit (1997) argues that the image restoration theory provides a useful guide for 
public relations practitioners, critics and educators in developing and critically evaluating 
messages during a crisis. Benoit's image restoration strategy includes four 
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recommendations for handling a crisis situation. The first element is to develop a crisis 
contingency plan and identify who will have overall responsibility. He argues that 
judicious planning may reduce response time and possibly prevent missteps in an 
organization's initial crisis response. 
Benoit's second recommendation involves identifying relevant audiences and 
publics during a crisis situation. The author argues that it is imperative to clearly identify 
and prioritize key audiences and tailor the organization's message in order to appease the 
most important audiences first. 
Benoit's (1997) third recommendation focuses on image repair. He proposes that 
an organization should communicate corrective or preventative plans they will enact to 
prevent such a crisis in the future to key publics. He believes that while audiences often 
want to know who to blame for a crisis, they are often appeased by knowing that steps 
have been taken to ensure that the potential for a similar calamity have been mitigated or 
eliminated. 
His fourth recommendation deals with the use of image repair discourse and the 
understanding of persuasive techniques. He recommends that organizations should avoid 
making false claims; provide adequate support for claims, develop themes throughout a 
campaign; and avoid arguments that may backfire. He examines the Exxon Valdez crisis 
and notes that Exxon delivered self-serving statements that conflicted with other 
information (their allegedly swift and competent cleanup). This perceived conflict may 
have damaged Exxons' credibility and undermined their arguments. 
Benoit also offers five broad categories of image repair strategies to provide tools 
for organizations during crisis situations. The five categories of image repair strategies 
Submarine Collision   9 
are: denial or shifting the blame; evading responsibility; reducing the offensiveness of the 
event; and promising corrective action and mortification (confess or beg forgiveness). 
Relaying Information Quickly and Establishing Control 
Scholars discuss the need for proactive crisis communications early in the life 
cycle of a crisis. Murphy (1996) states that early intervention in a crisis is at the heart of 
the chaos theory. She states that public relations practitioners tend to reserve their 
resources until a pivotal event occurs that could potentially affect public opinion of the 
organization. Such occurrences include nuclear accidents, product sabotage, takeover 
attempts and many others. If practitioners act quickly after such events, they can set the 
agenda and positively influence public perceptions. However, if they do not act quickly, 
they may not succeed in creating a situation that is congenial to their own organization. 
She states that Johnson & Johnson's rapid post-Tylenol actions entrenched a consumer- 
oriented image that resisted erosion during subsequent poisonings, whereas Exxon's post- 
Valdez inertia served to institutionalize public suspicions of managerial blundering and 
environmental insensitivity. 
Timely and proactive communications during times of crisis can mobilize 
support, reassure key audiences and show that a company is in control of the situation. 
Higbee (1992) argues that failing to communicate early will almost ensure that the 
situation grows and lingers long beyond the direct impact of the initial crisis. It is not 
uncommon for senior managers to reserve comment until they have all of the facts, but 
undue delays can be as dangerous as speculation. In most cases, the media will not wait 
to start reporting the story until the organization in the spotlight has all the particulars of 
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the event. Delaying communication is a risky tactic that could be perceived (and 
reported) as stonewalling by the media. 
Some scholars offer that a proactive stance with the media can have the positive 
effect of limiting how much coverage an organization receives during a crisis. Truitt 
(1993) states that "Rule Number One" of crisis communications is "tell the media who 
the source of the information will be, establish credibility for that source, establish when 
and where the information will be delivered and deliver the news accurately and when 
promised" (p. 280). He cites the example of the "Wall Street Murder" of 1987, where a 
stockbroker with Josephthal & Company was shot and killed in the firm's office in New 
York's financial district. He said quick handling of press kept the otherwise big news 
story confined to only one day's news cycle. 
Seitel (2001) analyzes crisis response after the terrorist attacks on Sept. 11, 2001, 
and prescribes six courses of action for communicators during a crisis. They are: lead 
with action; go quickly to the scene of the tragedy; communicate continually; 
demonstrate humanity; use symbols; and express optimism. He also argues that it is 
difficult to keep up with changing facts and information during a crisis but 
communicators should not sit back and wait for all the facts to emerge before 
communicating. 
This paper examines the February 2001 accidental collision between a U.S. Navy 
submarine with a Japanese fishing vessel. Based upon the literature reviewed, it will 
answer the following research question: Did the crisis communication strategies used by 
the Navy effecfively deal with the crisis? 
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III. METHODOLOGY 
Method 
A case study will be developed to study the U.S. Navy's crisis communications 
response to the USS Greeneville/Ehime Maru collision. 
Wimmer and Dominick (2000) define a case study as a qualitative research design 
which offers a detailed study or empirical inquiry that uses multiple sources of data to 
investigate, understand or explain a problem, especially social phenomena. Qualitative 
research offers descriptive or exploratory analysis of a phenomenon, which does not 
depend on the measurement of variables. They state that typical sources for case study 
data are documents, historical artifacts, systematic interviews, direct observations and 
surveys. 
Wimmer and Dominick (2000) offer four characteristics of case study research: 
particularistic, descriptive, heuristic and inductive. A particularistic case study looks at a 
particular event or occurrence. A descriptive case study is a comprehensive description 
of a topic under study. A heuristic case study helps researchers understand what is being 
studied and an inductive case study endeavors to find new relationships (mostly used in 
nature). This paper is a descriptive case study. 
Newsom, Scott and Turk (1993) state that public relations practitioners use case 
studies in two ways. First, they may pose a public relations problem and outline possible 
solutions according to specific guidelines, as suggested by an existing case. Second, they 
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may dissect a historical case as a learning experience to determine what worked, what 
didn't and why. 
Case 
The collision of the submarine, USS Greeneville with the Japanese fisheries 
research and training vessel touched off a international media firestorm and strained U.S. 
- Japanese relations for many months following the mishap.   The crisis subsided in 
October 1999 after the Navy's successful efforts in moving the Ehime Mam from 2,000 
feet of water to almost 100 feet so that the bodies of nine fishermen could be safely 
recovered and delivered back to their families in Japan. 
Research Design 
This case study will explore the crisis management performance of the U.S. Navy 
throughout the USS Greeneville crisis. It will seek to establish whether crisis 
communication efforts helped assuage the crisis or whether they were unsuccessful in 
dealing with the crisis. This paper will also explore whether more effective crisis 
communications could have been used. 
To obtain a better understanding of the Navy's crisis communications efforts, 
Department of Defense and U.S. Navy press release archives were searched looking for 
references to the accident. Interviews with U.S. Navy public affairs officers involved 
with crisis communications after the collision were also conducted. Two interviews were 
conducted on the phone with naval public affairs officers between November 20 and 
November 23, 2002. One interview was conducted in person on January 24, 2003. Each 
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interview lasted approximately one hour. One interview was conducted with Navy 
Lieutenant Commander David Werner who was the public affairs officer for the 
Commander of the Submarine Force of the United States' Pacific Fleet at the time of the 
accident. A second interview was conducted with Jon Yoshishige, the civilian media 
officer for the U.S. Pacific Fleet who was heavily involved with recovery efforts. A third 
interview was conducted with Commander Conrad Chun who was the media officer U.S. 
Pacific Fleet during the time of the mishap. (See Appendix I for questionnaire used in 
the interviews.) By exploring the service's crisis response to the Ehime Mam collision, 
this paper will attempt to identify its overall crisis strategies. 
Relevant articles published by The New York Times between February 10, 2001, 
and February 28, 2001, were also reviewed. The New York Times was selected due to its 
national distribution and in-depth reporting on the crisis. The paper has the highest 
circulation of any seven-day newspaper in America with a circulation of 1.1 million 
copies on weekdays and 1.7 million copies on weekends fNew York Times, 2003). This 
paper did not review opinion pieces, editorials or letters to the editor. Articles were 
obtained through searches on Lexis-Nexus and the New York Times website. Searches 
were conducted using the following search strings: "USS Greeneville," "Scott Waddle" 
or "Ehime Maru." 
Limitations 
The scope of this study is limited to the activities of the United States Navy 
during this particular situation. Since a case study is a qualitative research methodology, 
its findings cannot be generalized to all similar situations. Additionally, a qualitative 
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research design is thought to be less scientific due to its interpretive and subjective 
nature. While this study offers no comparative value since it only examines the 
particulars of this specific incident, it can offer some insights into effective or ineffective 
methods of dealing with comparable crisis situations. 
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IV. ANALYSIS 
Based on the principles of effective crisis communications outlined by the 
previously cited scholars (Benoit, 1997; Bumett,1998, Higbee, 1992; Lesly, 1991; Marra, 
1998; Murphy, 1996), this paper explores the United States Navy's handling of the crisis 
communication element of this accident. While there were numerous political, military 
and diplomatic aspects involved with the Greeneville/Ehime Maru collision, this paper 
will focus only on the performance of the Navy. 
The Navy and Benoit's Image Restoration Techniques 
Key elements of Benoit's (1997) image restoration strategy are the requirement to 
develop a crisis contingency plan and to have a designated spokesperson trained to 
respond prior to a crisis occurring. According to Commander Conrad Chun, a Navy 
public affairs officer working crisis communications during this incident, there were no 
specific plans in place for this type of crisis, however, many crisis communications plans 
have the same initial steps: notify appropriate leaders in the chain of command; initial 
release/response; maintaining a log of media queries; gathering as much info as possible 
and filtering out what's important (personal communication, January 24, 2003). 
According to Werner (personal communication, November 20, 2002), due to the 
risks associated with being a war-fighting organization, the Navy has developed 
numerous crisis response plans that incorporate crisis communications into the scenarios. 
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Additionally, the Navy has trained public affairs specialists to provide crisis 
communications when the need arises. These specialists also conduct routine media 
training for senior officers so that they may be best prepared to respond to media 
questions in the event of a crisis. 
Having a professional communicators and senior managers who are comfortable 
with the media was vital in how the service responded to the collision between the 
submarine and the Japanese fishing trawler. According to Commander Conrad Chun, a 
Navy public affairs officer working crisis communications during this incident, there 
were a number of "spokesmen" during the entire Greeneville incident (C.C. Chun, 
personal communication, January 24, 2003). "In the first days, Pacific Fleet took the vast 
majority of the media queries, with CHINFO [Navy Chief of Information Office] 
assisfing from Washington, D.C. For specific media events, it all depended on location 
and specifically what we were releasing." Chun offered that spokesmen ranged from 
senior Admirals in the Pacific area of responsibility to junior public affairs officers in 
Washington D.C.   For example. Commander Greg Smith, Navy pubic affairs officer 
working in Washington spoke with reporters about the submarine's search and rescue 
capabilities (Marquis, 2001) while Admiral Thomas Fargo, the Commander of the United 
States Pacific Fleet in Hawaii was quoted in The New York Times announcing that there 
would be an investigafion (Jehl, 2001). 
According to Werner (personal communication, November 20, 2002), the speed 
with which the crisis made headlines left little time for the Navy to react, forcing Navy 
public affairs specialists in Hawaii to focus almost exclusively on crisis management 
efforts for several weeks. The Navy's ability to quickly respond to media queries was in 
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keeping with Murphy's (1996) theory that early intervention is paramount if an 
organization wishes to positively influence public perceptions during a crisis. Werner 
issued an initial press release about the collision within one hour after the crisis and 
posted updated releases on the Pacific Submarine Command's website (D.E. Werner, 
personal communication, November 20, 2002). According to Chun (personal 
communication, January 24, 2003), many public affairs officers worked around the clock 
to provide what information they could to reporters. "Even when there wasn't much new 
information, we continued to field the calls through the night just to let reporters know 
that there was no new news." 
In terms of Benoit's (1997) second recommendation, identifying the relevant 
audiences in the crisis situation, the Navy proved equally effective. Werner (personal 
communication, November 20, 2002), stated that the Navy first focused on the immediate 
demands in dealing with 400 resident media organizations who sought comment on the 
accident. Recurring themes during communications included sympathy, regret, 
thoroughness, and fairness to all involved. While responsiveness was deemed more 
important than identifying specific audiences in early hours, three specific audiences 
were identified within 24 hours of the start of the crisis. Werner stated that the identified 
audiences were: the American public; Japanese citizens, with a focus on the families of 
Ehime Maru crewmembers; and the Navy's internal audience 
Benoit (1997) addresses the need for implementation of image restoration 
strategies and for making it known that actions are being taken to correct the problem. 
Utilizing the technique of mortification. Admiral Fargo quickly issued an apology to the 
Japanese people and passed on President Bush's condolences (Cushman, 2001). 
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Additionally, Admiral William J. Fallon, Navy's second-ranking officer, delivered a letter 
of apology from President Bush to Prime Min Yoshiro Mori and visited the families of 
nine people killed in the collision (French, 2001a). 
Using another image restoration technique, the Navy promised corrective action 
by relieving the commanding officer of the submarine pending the results of 
investigations by the Navy and the National Transportation Safety Board (Cushman, 
2001). The Navy also sought to reduce the offensiveness of the act by dedicating 
substantial resources in the recovery of the bodies from the Ehime Maru. 
Dealing with Perceptions 
In accordance with Murphy's (1996) chaos theory, the Navy's image was at risk 
at the onset of the crisis and continued as perceptions arose that the submarine did little to 
assist in the rescue efforts of the Japanese survivors (Marquis, 2001). The Navy's early 
response to media inquiries appeared to result in a balanced report of the accident and 
problems with the rescue effort. The New York Times' initial report quoted Commander 
Smith, stating that the Navy was hampered in assembling facts about the incident because 
rescuers were unable to speak Japanese. "There's a definite language barrier," Smith said 
(Marquis, 2001, para 8).   Soon after, however, interviews with Japanese survivors 
created a negative perception as the Japanese reportedly asked why the submariners did 
not join directly in rescue efforts, particularly in the half-hour just after the sinking, 
before Coast Guard ships and aircraft arrived (Jehl, 2001). 
This perception persisted over several days, requiring Navy officials to 
continually correct the record and explain how submarines are not well-suited to conduct 
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rescues at sea.    Navy spokespersons said in reply that choppy seas, with waves of three 
to four feet and a six-foot swell, had made it too dangerous for the Greeneville crew to 
open hatches and take survivors on board (D.E. Werner, personal communication, 
November 20, 2002). 
Rumors and speculation about the how the accident occurred began to appear in 
The New York Times. One veteran submarine commander, who asked not to be named, 
said in an interview that 16 guests crowded into the small control room could easily have 
distracted the Greeneville's top officers (Drew & Stemgold, 2001). "The senior 
supervisors maybe were paying too much attention to the V.I.P.'s and not enough to what 
was going on," he said. "I'm quite certain that was a factor" (para 19). 
Murphy's (1996) chaos theory states that an organization will lose the opportunity 
to control events in a crisis if it waits too long to initiate communication with relevant 
publics. The proactive stance by naval spokespersons allowed the organization to avoid 
this possibility by initiating communication early and responding to rumors and 
speculation (D.E. Werner, personal communication, November 20, 2002). 
The Navy crisis communicators were able to deal with media and pundit 
speculation effectively. This supports Marra's (1998) argument that organizational 
characteristics predict and explain crisis strategy effectiveness. The organization has in 
place a communication philosophy of "maximum disclosure with minimum delay" (D.E. 
Werner, personal communication, November 20, 2002). 
Navy spokespersons also faced the strategic issues of time pressure, limited 
control and high uncertainty that Burnett (1998) states are characteristics of all crisis 
situations. But the Navy public affairs staffs were manned sufficiently to deal with only 
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routine public affairs business and dealing with an enormous crisis that required around 
the clock manning was an additional challenge (D.E. Werner, personal communication, 
November 20, 2002). 
These challenges often resulted in delays in offering specifics of the crisis that 
were sometimes perceived as withholding information that negatively affected 
organizational credibility. An example would be the revelation by the media five days 
after the accident that two of the civilian visitors were actually at the controls of two 
important stations of the submarine when it hit the Japanese fishing vessel (Stemgold & 
Myers, 2001). This delay supports Higbee's (1992) argument that senior managers often 
desire to reserve comment until they have all of the facts during a crisis. The delay in 
revealing this information was widely reported in The New York Times and appeared to 
lessen the credibility of the Navy's message. 
According to Chun (personal communications, January 24, 2003) many factors 
influenced the decision to not release this information. Key factors included: maintaining 
the integrity of the Navy investigation; the degree to which civilians actually had 
"control"; and the timing of the National Transportation Safety Board's (NTSB) 
investigation. As many parallel investigations were ongoing, the Navy did not want to 
appear to be getting out in front of the NTSB in releasing information (C.C. Chun, 
personal communication, January 24, 2003). 
The Navy's effort in mitigating the reaction to this revelation was in keeping with 
Benoit's (1997) image restoration technique of promising corrective action. A February 
16, 2001 The New York Times stated, "the Navy has tightened its rules on allowing 
civilians to participate in training exercises aboard submarines, at least until the 
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investigation into the sinking of a Japanese fishing trawler off Hawaii is completed" (Dao 
& Drew, 2001, para 1). Two weeks later, the newspaper reported that facing mounting 
criticism, the Secretary of Defense extended the ban to include all military equipment 
(Sciolino, 2001). 
Recovery Efforts 
Burnett (1998) proposes that crisis resolutions have both short-term and long-term 
ramifications and the Navy was cognizant of both by preparing for the long-term crisis 
communication involved with recovery of the Ehime Maru, which was believed to be 
lying on the bottom of the Pacific Ocean in roughly 2,000 feet of water. They dispatched 
sophisticated underwater search equipment to Honolulu to search for the sunken vessel 
(Stemgold, 2001a) and announced a plan to explore the technical feasibility of recovering 
the remains of the trawler at the request of the Japanese government. 
Proper handling of the recovery of the vessel, remains, and personal effects was 
paramount in respect to family members and U.S./Japanese relations (Blackburn, 2002). 
Over the next eight months, the Navy had a proactive, open communication policy 
regarding recovery efforts leading to the actual relocation of the Ehime Maru from 2000 
feet of water to 115 feet of water by October 14, 2001 (J.J. Yoshishige, personal 
communication, November 23, 2002). The New York Times reported that the Navy 
succeeded in partly raising the ship in one of the most difficult and expensive recovery 
operations ever undertaken (Stemgold, 2001b). 
The effort and resources expended in pursuit to recover the bodies of the Japanese 
fishermen helped mend relations between the two nations. The New York Times 
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reported that the $60 million undersea recovery effort in which bodies of eight of nine 
victims were recovered, as well as other gestures, went a long way toward restoring good 
will (French, 2001b). In summing up the operation, Navy Rear Admiral William Klemm, 
director of the Ehime Maru Recovery Effort said those involved in the operation 
overcame significant technical difficulties in order to provide closure to the families of 
the missing crewmembers. "The gratitude they showed us justified the operation. We 
are pleased that we were able to recover the remains of eight crewmembers, but our 
prayers continue to be with the Mizuguchis (the family of the ninth missing 
crewmember) in their loss" (U.S. Pacific Fleet, 2001, para 17). 
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V. DISCUSSION 
This paper analyzed the crisis that the U.S. Navy faced after a submarine 
accidentally collided with a Japanese fishing trawler off the coast of Honolulu, Hawaii on 
February 9, 2001. After analyzing the crisis, this researcher concludes that the Navy 
conducted effective crisis communications with limited exceptions adhering to scholarly 
models of crisis communication and image restoration. 
The Navy's crisis communication response were in keeping with the models 
proposed by scholarly literature (Benoit, 1997; Burnett, 1998, Higbee,1992; Lesly, 1991; 
Marra, 1998; Murphy, 1996) by: acting quickly; naming spokespersons early; countering 
rumors and speculation; being open, honest and forthright in communications; and 
identifjang key audiences. 
Early intervention by Navy crisis communicators did much to enable the service 
to enact a measure of control during a volatile situation in which the organization's image 
was at risk. This supports Murphy's (1996) theory that early intervention is paramount if 
an organization wishes to positively influence public perceptions during a crisis and 
avoid losing control of the situation. In other words, early intervention helped the Navy 
avoid "chaos." According to Werner (personal communication, November 20, 2002), its 
quick response in the early hours of the crisis placed the Navy in a good position to be 
able to exert a measure of control during the volatile situation. 
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The Navy successfully followed Marra's (1998) model of strategic crisis 
communications by planning for the long-range aspects of the crisis while still heavily 
engaged with the short-term aspects of the crisis during early hours. The strategic plan to 
recover the trawler and the remains of those on board was communicated by naval 
officials early in the crisis. 
The Navy used key elements of Benoit's (1997) image restoration strategy which 
were vital in the service's overall effectiveness. The organization had ingrained crisis 
communication into its organizational fabric. Part of this dynamic was the development 
of a core group of public affairs specialists equipped to provide proactive crisis 
communication when the need arises. 
Based on information gained through interviews with Chun (personal 
communication, January 24, 2003), Werner (personal communication, November 20, 
2002) and Yoshishige (personal communication, November 23, 2002), this researcher 
was able to determine that the Navy had significant crisis communications strategies in 
place prior to the collision of the USS Greeneville and the Ehime Maru. It was clear that 
the Navy's handling of the crisis presented sufficient evidence that the organization 
effectively integrated crisis management into its overall strategy. 
The Navy also identified relevant audiences per Benoit's (1997) second 
recommendation. Ensuring that the organization communicated its actions to the 
American public, while not minimizing its responsibilities to Japanese audiences and 
organizational employees was a key aspect in the successful handling on the crisis. 
The Navy effectively implemented image restoration techniques during the crisis 
per Benoit's (1997) recommendations. The first and most effective technique used by 
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Navy officials was mortification. Offering an apology to Japan and the families of those 
killed during the crisis was a powerful first step in restoring the Navy's tarnished image 
during the crisis. 
The Navy was successfiil in adhering to another of Benoit's (1997) image 
restoration strategies of promising corrective action numerous times throughout the crisis. 
The first corrective action communicated was the removal of the commanding officer of 
the submarine immediately after the collision until an investigation could be conducted. 
The second promise of corrective action came when the Navy announced a halt to 
civilian embarks until the program could be reviewed. 
The Navy also effectively used bolstering techniques during the crisis. The 
strategic commitment to recover the fishing trawler and the remains of nine fishermen 
still onboard fi-om 2,000 feet of water was key in bolstering organizational image by 
expressing a sincere concern for the families of those who died in the collision. Japanese 
religious customs require that the bodies of those who have died be recovered and this 
commitment from the Navy in recovering the bodies helped repair its image with the 
Japanese people. 
Despite largely effective crisis communications, the Navy did experience some 
setbacks during the crisis due issues of time pressure, limited control and the high 
uncertainty that Burnett (1998) discusses in his literature.   When the media, and not the 
Navy, revealed that two of the civilian visitors were actually at the controls of two 
important stations of the submarine when it hit the Japanese fishing vessel, the Navy's 
credibility was questioned, placing the organization in a reactive posture for a degree of 
time before they could suitably recover. 
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Chun believes that Navy crisis communication efforts were successful in many 
areas, but could have been better in a few other areas, "[the Navy] publicly said that we 
should have disclosed sooner that civilians were at the controls but hindsight is 20/20. 
This was such a complex incident... .1 don't think there were many PAOs out there who 
could've anticipated the heavy media reaction to the discovery of that one fact" (C.C. 
Chun, personal communication, January 24, 2003). 
Submarine Collision 27 
VI. CONCLUSION 
This paper examined the importance of integrating crisis communication into 
organizational strategies as demonstrated in the case of the Navy's crisis stemming from 
the at-sea collision between a submarine and a civilian Japanese fishing trawler 
The sea service's quick reaction to media inquiry and its communication 
philosophy of "maximum disclosure with minimum delay" served them well throughout 
the complicated and volatile situation. Despite the setback experienced after the media 
disclosure of civilians sitting at key control stations during the collision, the 
organization's use of image restoration strategies was effective in helping the Navy 
"weather the storm." 
This case study is limited to the U.S. Navy's crisis communication response the 
Greeneville/Ehime Maru collision, however, what was studied here provides insight into 
how the effective use of crisis communication and image restoration techniques can 
benefit an organization facing a volatile crisis in which its image might be tarnished or 
destroyed. 
Due to the scope of the crisis and the number of organizations involved, many 
elements could not be effectively explored within this paper. Additional elements that 
bear further analysis include the involvement by other agencies such as the State 
Department, the White House, the Department of Defense, the National Transportation 
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and Safety Board, and the government of Japan. In the future, it would be interesting to 
explore crisis communication issues from the diplomatic and political point of view. 
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APPENDIX 
The following questions were asked during the interview with three U.S. Navy 
public affairs officers who were involved with crisis communication efforts after the 
submarine, USS Greeneville, accidentally collided with the Japanese fishing trawler, 
Ehime Maru in February 2001. 
1. What crisis management plans were in place at the Pacific Submarine Command 
and at Pacific Fleet Headquarters at to the time of the collision? 
2. How long did it take to identify who had operational control of the crisis? 
3. How long did it take to identify a spokesman for this crisis? 
4. Why did it take five days to admit that two civilians were at the key controls of 
the submarine? Why was this fact not revealed by the Navy? 
5. What were the key audiences targeted immediately after the crisis? 
6. What were the key messages you wished to convey? 
7. Do you think the crisis communication efforts were successful? 
8. Would you have done anything differently? 
